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FICTIONS OF THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHY THE UNITED 
STATES SPACE ACT OF 2015 IS ILLEGAL 
ABSTRACT 
In 2015, the United States passed The Spurring Private Aerospace 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015 (the “SPACE Act of 2015”), 
a domestic law creating private celestial property rights for any US citizen who 
can appropriate an outer space resource. This creation of a private property 
interest stands in stark opposition to the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the “Outer Space 
Treaty”), which entered into force in 1967. The Outer Space Treaty is accepted 
by all space-faring nations, and it contains a non-appropriation doctrine in 
Article II that bars states from claiming territorial ownership of celestial bodies 
and resources. There is a split among academics on how to interpret the Article 
II prohibition. Specifically, many are not sure whether the appropriation extends 
only to sovereigns (by a narrow interpretation), or if it covers private entities as 
well (by a broad interpretation).  
This Comment argues that a broad interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty 
is proper, and that the SPACE Act of 2015 violates the Treaty’s bar on 
appropriation. Taking into account methods of treaty interpretation and 
examining the historical context at the time the Treaty was drafted supports a 
broad interpretation. This Comment proposes that there is indeed much to be 
desired by allowing and supporting celestial development, but that a change in 
the international regulatory regime is necessary to allow the SPACE Act of 2015 
to operate without violating the Outer Space Treaty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A man in California has a vision to achieve what is out of reach for even the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). His idea seems crazy, 
but he says he can pull it off in less than six years.1 The vision: to send humans 
to Mars.2  
Elon Musk presented a concrete business plan for sending humans to Mars 
during a conference on September 22, 2017.3 Musk’s company, SpaceX, is a 
private American aerospace organization that is the market leader in the United 
States space travel industry, and one of the most prominent private aerospace 
travel companies in the world.4 The dreams of Mr. Musk are not all that out of 
reach, given SpaceX’s accomplishments and milestones. SpaceX is the first 
private company successfully to launch cargo rockets to the International Space 
Station,5 but Musk is not alone in these endeavors.  
Another American company, Moon Express, is working to launch the first 
private lunar mission to the Moon with hopes, eventually, to mine it.6 Companies 
like SpaceX and Moon Express are not only proposing big ideas, there is big 
money behind them and they fully intend to put it to work.7 SpaceX is valued at 
around $21 billion,8 and Moon Express has raised over $45 million,9 
demonstrating the seriousness and commitment that private companies are 
willing to put forth to advance human interaction with outer space to a new level.  
 
 1 SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/mars (last visited Feb. 2, 2018). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Adam Baidawi & Kenneth Chang, Musk’s Mars Vision: A One-Size-Fits-All Rocket. A Very Big One, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2017, at B3, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/science/elon-musk-mars.html. 
 4 Jay Bennett, One Chart Shows How Much SpaceX Has Come to Dominate Rocket Launches, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (July 13, 2017), https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/rockets/a27290/one-chart-spacex-
dominate-rocket-launches/.  
 5 Kenneth Chang, First Private Craft Docks With Space Station, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at A12, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09First%20Private%20Craft%20Docks%20With%20Space%20Station/28/scie
nce/elon-musk-mars.html. 
 6 Fact Sheet–Moon Express Payload Review Determination, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa. 
gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20595; MOON EXPRESS, http://www.moonexpress.com/ 
expeditions/ (last visited October 5, 2018).  
 7 Baidawi & Chang, supra note 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 6.  
 8 Katie Benner & Kenneth Chang, SpaceX is Now One of the World’s Most Valuable Privately Held 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/technology/spacex-is-now-one-
of-the-worlds-most-valuable-privately-held-companies.html. 
 9 Lori Loannou, Billionaire Closer to Mining the Moon for Trillions of Dollars in Riches, CNBC (Jan. 
31, 2017, 8:13 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/31/billionaire-closer-to-mining-moon-for-trillions-of-
dollars-in-riches.html. 
TAYLORCOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 11:15 AM 
2019] FICTIONS OF THE FINAL FRONTIER 655 
But what if they cannot? What if it is all for nothing? What if the very dreams 
that these billions of dollars stand for are completely illegal? A domestic U.S. 
law, The Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act 
of 2015 (SPACE Act of 2015), creates private celestial property rights for any 
U.S. citizen who can appropriate an outer space resource.10 This creation of a 
property right contradicts the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space Treaty), which 
prohibits appropriation of celestial bodies and resources,11 creating dissonance 
between domestic U.S. law and an international treaty to which the United States 
is a party. 
On November 19, 2015, President Obama signed into law the SPACE Act 
of 2015.12 Aimed at supporting outer space endeavors like those of SpaceX and 
Moon Express, the Act provides legal support for private ownership of outer 
space resources.13 Among other things, the Act provides that United States 
citizens have the right to appropriate property in outer space for commercial 
purposes, and to do so “free from harmful interference.”14 
Internationally, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force in 1967 and has 
wide acceptance by all space-faring states,15 with a total of 107 signatories.16 
The Treaty is widely viewed as the principal international legal instrument 
governing outer space,17 and it entered into force on the heels of the 1957 Soviet 
Union launch of Sputnik-1, cognizant of the Cold War “Space Race” between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.18 Article II of the Treaty contains its 
 
 10 See H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 11 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into 
force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 12 H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 13 See id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.  
 16 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N., 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
 17 See Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and Nonbinding Agreements 
on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289, 292 (2012); Leslie Tennen, Symposium: 
The Promise and Perils of an International Law of Property Enterprise Rights and the Legal Regime for 
Exploitation of Outer Space Resources, 47 UNIV. PAC. L. REV. 281, 282 (2016).  
 18 See Matthew J. Kleiman, Space Law 101: An Introduction to Space Law, A.B.A., https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/space_law_101_an_introdu
ction_to_space_law.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2017); FRANS VON DER DUNK, International Space Law, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 29, 35 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015).  
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non-appropriation doctrine concerning the use of celestial resources.19 The 
specific language in Article II refers to “national appropriation by a claim of 
sovereignty,”20 and many scholars accept that the Article exists to bar nations 
from claiming territorial ownership of celestial bodies and resources.21 It is 
without question that drafters of the Outer Space Treaty only contemplated state 
actor interest in, and ability to actually fund and develop, space-faring 
technologies.  
The state of international culture and technology is very different today than 
it was during the emergence of the Outer Space Treaty fifty years ago.22 Outer 
space is no longer the domain of exclusively state actors; a shift to private-sector 
development of space is underway.23 It remains unsettled whether the non-
appropriation doctrine in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty covers: (1) all 
entities, thus stunting the dreams of private aerospace companies before they 
even start, or (2) only state actors, allowing for wide private-sector development 
in outer space.  
In recent years, academics have debated how to interpret Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty. The broad interpretation argues that Article II governs all 
actors, private and state, thus prohibiting all forms of appropriation in outer 
space.24 Scholars advocating for a narrow interpretation of the Outer Space 
Treaty argue that because Article II is silent as to private actors and only 
addresses sovereign actors, there is no prohibition of private appropriation of 
outer space resources.25 However, an examination through the lens of the plain 
language of the text, taking into account the historical context at the time the 
treaty was drafted, the argument for a narrow interpretation raises further 
conflict. Sovereign recognition of ownership is essential to private ownership of 
something in outer space.26 Private ownership of something cannot exist without 
 
 19 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.  
 20 Id. 
 21 See Bryon Brittingham, Does the World Really Need New Space Law?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 37 
(2010); Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space, 
41 CASE W. RESERVE J. INT’L L. 119, 125-26 (2009); John Myers, Comment, Extraterrestrial Property Rights: 
Utilizing the Resources of the Final Frontier, 18 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 77, 94 (2016); Alexander William Salter, 
Ordering the Cosmos: Private Law and Celestial Property Rights, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 311, 312 (2017).  
 22 See Kleiman, supra note 18. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See FABIO TRONCHETTI, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 
769, 779–81 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015); Jijo George Cherian & Job Abraham, Concept of Private Property 
in Space – An Analysis, 2 J. INT’L COMM. L. & TECH. 211, 213 (2007). 
 25 Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law: Could a 
Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 44–45 (2008). 
 26 Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371 (1954). 
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first being granted by a sovereign,27 therefore a narrow interpretation of Article 
II fails because it rests on the creation of an illegal property right over celestial 
resources by private entities.  
This Comment argues for a broad interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty 
and urges a change in the international regulatory regime allowing the SPACE 
Act of 2015 to operate without violating international treaty law. Recognizing 
that property ownership flows from sovereign recognition and that private 
ownership of something requires a state to reinforce this recognition, the Treaty, 
through its language in Article II, should apply to all actors, state and private. A 
proper textual interpretation of the treaty shows that the drafters intended for the 
non-appropriation doctrine to cover all entities: private and state. Methods of 
treaty interpretation, its travaux préparatoires, and a historical analysis of global 
culture at the time of the treaty’s drafting and ratification supports this stance. 
As written, the Outer Space Treaty prohibits both state and private exploitation 
and appropriation of outer space resources. By allowing private appropriation in 
outer space, the United States, through the SPACE Act of 2015, is committing a 
prohibited act of sovereignty within the scope of Article II of the Treaty, thus 
creating a conflict that may invalidate the U.S. law. 
Resolving this dissonance requires a shift in international law or recognized 
property regimes of private appropriation of celestial resources without violating 
the Outer Space Treaty. A natural extension of any discussion of outer space 
appropriation is a discussion of specific international property regimes 
analogous to outer space, including the law of the high seas and Antarctica. That 
discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. Further, this Comment does 
not address the legal status of states that have not signed the Outer Space Treaty, 
or citizens of states that have not signed the Treaty.     
This Comment, in Part II, outlines the history and relevant text of both the 
Outer Space Treaty and the SPACE Act of 2015, examining both legislative 
history and the global context of their drafting. Part III defines and applies the 
three most widely-accepted methods of treaty interpretation to the Outer Space 
Treaty. Part IV compares the methods of treaty interpretation and demonstrates 
how they support the conclusion that a broad interpretation of the Outer Space 
Treaty is most proper. Part V addresses how a narrow interpretation of the Treaty 
conflicts with its text. The final section will propose that the SPACE Act of 
2015, as currently written, is invalid as against the Outer Space Treaty, and will 
 
 27 Id.  
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explore potential solutions that could resolve the dissonance between the Treaty 
and the Act.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History and Text of the Outer Space Treaty 
The origins of international space law are traceable to the 1957 creation of 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS).28 Primarily established in response to the Soviet Union’s successful 
launch of Sputnik-1, the formation of the committee was unprecedented, as it 
created an entire new field of public international law: the law of outer space.29 
In what scholar Frans von der Dunk refers to as three phases, COPUOS 
developed juris spatialis internationalis by drafting five treaties governing the 
various aspects of human interaction with outer space.30 Only two of those 
treaties, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, address property rights.31  
In its first phase, the committee produced little that was legally binding.32 Of 
particular interest is a draft called the Principles Declaration, which is the 
skeleton of what became the Outer Space Treaty.33 The second phase saw more 
substantial development, as the committee converted the Principles Declaration 
into the Outer Space Treaty, receiving wide acceptance and enjoying the 
signature of 107 states to date.34 The third phase of COPUOS is characterized as 
a return to the development of international space law through non-binding 
resolutions, much as it did in phase one.35 On January 27, 1967, the Outer Space 
 
 28 NATHAN V. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 23 (1996). 
 29 PETER JANKOWITSCH, The Background and History of Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 1, 5 
(Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015). 
 30 See id. at 26; VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 37 (The other four treaties that came out of COPUOUS 
are The Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement.); 
JANKOWITSCH, supra note 29, at 12.  
 31 See VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 99–100 (The Moon Agreement has received wide criticism for 
its broad international jurisdiction over outer space, which is apparent in the fact that only seventeen states have 
ratified it, none of them being space-faring nations, including the United States.); United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs, supra note 16; Taylor R. Dalton, Developing the Final Frontier: Defining Private 
Property Rights on Celestial bodies for the Benefit of All Mankind 11 (Cornell L. Sch. Graduate Student Papers, 
Paper No. 25, 2010), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=lps_papers. 
 32 VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 38. 
 33 Id. at 39. 
 34 Id.; see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, supra note 16. 
 35 VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 41. 
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Treaty was opened for signature, and it has currently been ratified by over one 
hundred states, including all space-faring nations.36 
The Outer Space Treaty very clearly outlines the principles that were 
important to its drafters and the international community at the time of its 
creation. With a focus on regulating the use of outer space, it contains several 
important stances including a prohibition on the use of weapons of mass 
destruction in outer space, the requirement that celestial exploration be for the 
benefit of countries as “the province of all mankind,” and the requirement that 
states aid all astronauts and regulate jurisdiction over their space objects.37  
Most controversial, however, is the Article II prohibition on the 
appropriation of outer space. Article II concisely states: “Outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”38  
Article I provides an important backdrop about equality among states and 
opportunity to explore upon which the drafters’ intent in Article II can best be 
understood:  
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests 
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, 
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and 
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be 
freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage 
international cooperation in such investigation.39 
The idea that outer space should be a province for equal use among all 
countries in cooperation with one another is prevalent. The drafters express this 
intention explicitly in Article I, and it works in the background throughout the 
entirety of the Treaty by creating a tone against unfair advantage among 
countries.  
 
 36 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11; Comm. On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal 
Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (2015); United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs, supra note 16. 
 37 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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Article VI echoes that tone specifically with regard to state control and 
responsibility for anything they do or place in outer space. The Article puts a 
significant “international responsibility” on states for the “national activities” 
they carry out in outer space.40 It imposes that responsibility not only on states 
themselves, but also, by extension, to non-sovereign entities by requiring states 
to ensure that activities “carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities . . . are carried out in conformity with the provisions set 
forth in the present Treaty.”41 Therefore, the Treaty clearly, in Article VI, 
contemplates private actors and firmly places their activities within the 
jurisdiction and responsibility of the state of which they are citizens. The Article 
further requires sponsoring states to “authoriz[e] and [provide] continuing 
supervision” over the activities of non-sovereign entities in outer space.42 It is 
apparent by the early language of the Treaty that preserving outer space for 
peaceful, non-territorial uses—by states or private entities—is important to its 
drafters, and that intent has express incorporation into the text itself.  
The Outer Space Treaty has been used as a basis for subsequent international 
agreements, perhaps the most well-known of which is the Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).43 
The Moon Treaty built upon the language of the Outer Space Treaty by adding 
that “the moon shall be used . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes,” and 
mandates that states “shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing 
balance of [the] environment”.44 
While it does not directly adopt the principal purpose of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the Moon Treaty takes things a step further and asserts that celestial 
resources are the “common heritage of mankind,” thereby adopting an 
international law common heritage approach to outer space.45 This common 
heritage approach to international space law rests on five tenets: (1) there is an 
absolute bar on both private and state appropriation of celestial resources in outer 
space; (2) celestial resources are for the benefit of all states and every state 
should manage and care for them; (3) because celestial resources are for the 
benefit of all states, any benefit a state attains must be shared with all other 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 G.A. Res. 34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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states; (4) outer space may not be used for military purposes; and (5) outer space 
must be preserved by states for future generations.46  
The common heritage approach adopted by the Moon Treaty is very 
controversial as evinced by the fact that it has the signature of only two space-
faring states.47 Developing nations, especially those without the means or ability 
to explore outer space, are supportive of the Moon Treaty and its common 
heritage effect.48 The largest issue with the Moon Treaty is element (3)—that 
celestial resources are for the benefit of all states and should be shared with all 
other states.49 Although signed by relatively few states, the purpose behind the 
passage of the Moon Treaty and its provisions that bar property rights in outer 
space echo and support the same purpose of the earlier Outer Space Treaty. 
Through passage of the Moon Treaty, the international community once again 
expressed its desire for complete non-appropriation of planets and celestial 
resources.  
B. History and Text of the SPACE Act of 2015 
In the fifty years following the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, the United 
States has found itself in a very different space-faring world than it did in 1967. 
Private American companies with big aspirations of celestial travel and 
exploitation have the money, the ideas, and the technology; they just need the 
legal backing. 
The United States’ response to these growing needs was by way of House 
Bill 1508, a proposed act that specifically addressed United States citizen 
exploitation and ownership of asteroid resources.50 The proposed act was headed 
by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology with the intent to 
“establish a legal framework to govern property rights of resources obtained 
from asteroids enabling this new industry and providing clarity for future 
entrepreneurs.”51 Among other components, the bill would enable the President 
to “promote the right of United States commercial entities to explore outer space 
and utilize space resources, in accordance with the existing international 
 
 46 See id. 
 47 See Brittingham, supra note 21, at 38. (The only space-faring states that have signed the Moon Treaty 
are France and India). See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), NTI (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-
regimes/agreement-governing-activities-states-moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-moon-agreement. 
 48 See id. at 39. 
 49 G.A. Res. 34/68 (Dec. 5, 1979). 
 50 H.R. 1508, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
 51 H.R. Rep. No. 114-153, at 3 (2015). 
TAYLORCOMMENTPROOFS_6.5.19 6/5/2019 11:15 AM 
662 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
obligations of the United States, free from harmful interference, and to transfer 
or sell such resources.”52  
Many problems with the proposed bill were raised early on.53 While still in 
debate on the House floor, Representative Donna Edwards of Maryland pointed 
out the non-appropriation conflict between the proposed bill and the Outer Space 
Treaty.54 She asserted that the bill would undoubtedly run into this conflict if 
passed, and recommended more hearings to flesh the conflict out.55 Relying on 
the act of sovereignty theory, Representative Edwards also addressed the 
temporal concern that the bill was premature in that it would allow the new 
aerospace industry an essentially “regulation free” opportunity to work without 
specific safety requirements, thereby not requiring any industry standards to be 
implemented.56 The act of sovereignty theory that Representative Edwards was 
referring to is the idea that private appropriation of outer space resources 
constitutes an act of sovereignty because property rights are granted by states.57 
Skepticism and resistance persisted during the Committee consideration 
stage by the minority-view leaders.58 They claimed that there seemed to be a 
conflict between the proposed bill and the Outer Space Treaty.59 Relying on an 
opinion submitted by Professor Joanne Gabrynowicz of the University of 
Mississippi Law School, the minority argued that inclusion of the phrase: 
“consistence with the existing international obligations of the United States,” did 
not automatically resolve the international conflicts it posed.60  
The minority-view advanced three other points of conflict. First, on the 
counsel of Professor Gabrynowicz, they identified that the bill lacked any system 
of licensing for these outer space endeavors,61 resulting in many practical 
problems. Second, the minority took issue with the language: “obtain[ed] such 
resources,” claiming that such language implies asserting territorial sovereign 
property rights over celestial bodies—something that is prohibited by the Outer 
 
 52 H.R. 1508, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).  
 53 See 161 Cong. Rec. H3513 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (letter from Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz submitted 
for the record by Rep. Edwards). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 161 Cong. Rec. H3512-14 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
 57 See 161 Cong. Rec. H3513 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (letter from Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz submitted 
for the record by Rep. Edwards). 
 58 H.R. Rep. No. 114-153, at 20 (2015). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 15. 
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Space Treaty.62 Finally, it was pointed out by the minority that they were 
unaware of any United States agency supportive of the bill.63  
The majority-view eventually won out, even though the Act has “no 
licensing regime to govern the activities undertaken in the bill.”64 The bill is 
important, if for no other reason, because it is the first of its kind to take property 
rights in outer space under real scrutiny, and it is timely because of the growing 
private space technology industries. There was clearly a push from the majority-
view for passage of the bill without a great deal of specific licensing and 
regulation for fear that it would unnecessarily stamper the work of the new 
private aerospace industry.  
House Bill 1508 was eventually incorporated into the SPACE Act of 2015.65 
The House of Representatives passed the act by a 284 to 133 margin, and the 
Senate passed it on November 10, 2015.66 President Obama signed it into law 
on November 25, 2015.67  
In its final form, the Act outlines property rights United States citizens may 
have over space resources:  
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an 
asteroid resource or space resource under this chapter shall be entitled 
to any asteroid resources or space resources obtained, including to 
possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space 
resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the 
international obligations of the United States.68  
There is much scholarly discussion about the purpose and intent behind the 
United States’ passage of the Space Act of 2015 in the first place, especially 
considering the apparent conflicts the minority-view highlighted during the 
bill’s consideration.69 Some suggest that the theory of pedis possessio is the 
principal force behind the statute, especially considering the language about 
 
 62 Id. at 21. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, Pub. L. No. 114-19, 129 Stat. 
704 (2015). 
 69 Thomas J. Herron, Note, Student Note: Deep Space Thinking: What Elon Musk’s Idea to Nuke Mars 
Teaches U About Regulating the “Visionaries and Daredevils” of Outer Space, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 553, 
592 (2016). 
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recovering celestial resources “free from harmful interference.”70 Pedis 
possessio is the idea “that citizens should have the right to explore for and 
recover space resources ‘free from harmful interference.’”71 Suggestive of open 
freedom to claim property rights over any celestial resource that a United States 
citizen takes in outer space, pedis possessio offers insight into a possible 
aspiration of free claim over outer space, which the United States may be 
pushing for.72  
Others claim that the United States’ intent with the Space Act of 2015 is not 
to claim the type of appropriation prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty, but 
instead to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over in-situ resources its citizens 
appropriate in outer space.73 Under this argument, states themselves do not 
appropriate celestial resources, but instead merely regulate the resources 
appropriated by their citizens.74 The argument further claims that because states 
have jurisdiction over objects they send into outer space, they can validly 
regulate those endeavors.75 Because states can regulate such endeavors, they 
may regulate private projects to exploit in-situ celestial resources without 
“appropriating” the outer space territory from which they were taken.76 It is 
possible to infer from the language in the SPACE Act of 2015 that the United 
States believes the appropriation it authorizes by the Act is not really 
“appropriation,” but is instead merely a way to establish a regulatory jurisdiction 
over in-situ celestial resources.77 
Thus, the purpose behind the passage of the SPACE Act of 2015 is less clear 
than the purpose articulated by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Nonetheless, the history of both lead to text that is open to interpretation.  
II. METHODS OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION  
Much like statutes, treaties are subject to interpretation after their drafting 
and entry into force—especially in instances of ambiguity or confusion as to 
 
 70 See id. 
 71 Craig Foster, Excuse Me, You’re Mining My Asteroid: Space Property Rights and the U.S. Space 
Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 407, 421 (2016) (citing Space 
Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015 § 402 (codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. § 51302(a)(3) 
(2015)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 114-153, 2015)). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Herron, supra note 69, at 595.  
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. (noting that national governments retain jurisdiction over items sent into outer space).  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 596.  
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their effects.78 “The purpose of interpretation is to establish the meaning of the 
text” and apply it to a real problem.79 Treaty interpretation is almost always 
based on the guidelines set forth in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Vienna Convention),80 which has wide acceptance with 116 state 
parties to it.81 Even though the United States is a not a party to the Convention, 
the United States recognizes almost all of the Convention’s provisions as 
binding customary international law and thus acknowledges its authority.82 The 
Vienna Convention specifically outlines three methods of treaty interpretation: 
(a) the textualist approach, (b) the intentionalist approach, and (c) the 
teleological approach.83  
The textualist—or literal—approach to treaty interpretation has its roots in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.84 It states: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”85 The 
textualist approach, therefore, contains three elements: (i) treaty interpretation 
should always be in good faith,86 (ii) the terms of a treaty should be given their 
ordinary meaning, unless doing so “results in a meaning incompatible with the 
spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in which the words are 
contained,”87 and (iii) context determines a treaty’s ordinary meaning, taking 
into consideration its object and purpose.88 The textualist approach is, therefore, 
the basic, step-one rule of treaty interpretation. Only if a textualist analysis leads 
to a “‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ result,” or if the text itself is 
“ambiguous or obscure[,]” should one turn to secondary methods of 
interpretation.89 
 
 78 LASSA F. L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1272 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 2008). 
 79 Id at 1271. 
 80 DAVID J. BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 21 (2003).  
 81 UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF TREATIES, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
 82 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 18.  
 83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331.  
 84 OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 1271.  
 85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at 340.  
 86 OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 1272. 
 87 Id. (quoting South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 315, 
336 (Dec. 21)). 
 88 Id. at 1273. 
 89 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 22–23 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra 
note 83, at 340). 
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The broad text in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides an ordinary 
and unambiguous meaning free from absurdity.90 The language of Article II is 
short: “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not 
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.”91 At first glance, the language clearly 
intends to bar ownership over all aspects of outer space, with the only wrinkle 
of confusion being the meaning of “national appropriation.” Stephen Gorove, a 
space law expert, has suggested it is better to first define appropriation before 
determining how “national” modifies the term.92 Broadly, appropriation is “the 
taking of property for one’s own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence.”93 
In this regard, appropriation is of a “national” character when it is by an entity 
under the sovereignty of the state from which they come or represent.94 Even 
though Article II uses the “national” language, its ordinary meaning is most 
closely linked to all sovereignties and the individuals and entities that attain 
property rights under the authority of a sovereign.  
A separate insight of classic legal realism logically lends itself to the same 
conclusion. For an individual to hold property rights in something, the 
government must legally recognize the property rights.95 The language of Article 
II bars governments from recognizing property interests in outer space for 
themselves. Because individuals and private entities cannot hold property rights 
in something without recognition from a sovereign that it will protect their 
rights, a correct interpretation of the language of Article II should bar the ability 
of private entities and individuals to appropriate rights over celestial resources 
as well. If a state recognizes a property right held by an individual over a celestial 
body or resource, such recognition would constitute a form of national 
appropriation because it is essentially “a de facto exclusion of other states and 
their nationals” to that body or resource.96 The text of Article II naturally leads 
 
 90 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11. 
 91 Id.  
 92 See Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 352 
(1969) (“With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is what constitutes ‘appropriation,’ as 
used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use.”). 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. (“Under such interpretation the establishment of a permeant settlement or the carrying out of 
commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the 
activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state.”). 
 95 See Cohen, supra note 26, at 374 (“[P]roperty [is that] to which the following label can be attached: To 
the world: / Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. / Signed: Private citizen 
/ Endorsed: The state”).  
 96 Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. 
L. REV. 794, 805 (2010). 
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to the conclusion that its non-appropriation language is binding on all actors—
state and private.  
A. Intentionalist Approach 
The second method of treaty interpretation, the intentionalist approach, 
governs when a textualist analysis “[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure” 
or “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”97 Grounded 
in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, this approach seeks to interpret a treaty 
in the way most closely aligned with the intent of its drafters.98 The intentionalist 
analysis involves looking to other sources to ascertain the drafters’ intent 
through context, such as a treaty’s travaux préparatoires.99 Travaux 
préparatoires are “[m]aterials used in preparing the ultimate form of an 
agreement or statute, and especially of an international treaty; the draft or 
legislative history of a treaty.”100 “Context,” as defined in the Vienna 
Convention, includes “[a]ny agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty” and 
“[a]ny instrument . . . made by one or more parties . . . and accepted by the other 
parties.”101 
In this case, because the textualist approach does not lead to an obscure or 
ambiguous meaning regarding Article II, further interpretation is not necessary. 
Nonetheless, an analysis of the intent of its drafters further supports the same 
conclusion. The Outer Space Treaty began as General Assembly Resolution 
1148 of November 14, 1957.102 Resolution 1148 is aimed at preventing means 
of war and mass destruction by “decreasing the danger of war and improving the 
prospects of a durable peace through achieving international agreement on 
reduction, limitation and open inspection of armaments and armed forces.”103 
The Resolution further extends its rationale of peace to the prospects of outer 
space, claiming that outer space “shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific 
purposes.”104  
 
 97 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at 340.  
 98 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 21–22. 
 99 Id. at 22.  
 100 Travaux Pr. . .paratoires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 83, at 340. 
 102 G.A. Res. 1148 (XII), at 3 (Nov. 14, 1957).  
 103 Id. at 3. 
 104 Id. at 4. 
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After the creation of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space by 
the General Assembly adoption of Resolution 1472,105 two internal committees 
were established for legal and scientific questions, respectively.106 The 
subcommittee for legal questions saw draft opinions on Resolution 1148 from 
the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Arab.107 The proposal 
submitted by the Soviet Union is the first containing a clause about property 
rights, stating: “Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use 
by all States; no State may claim sovereignty over outer space or celestial 
bodies.”108 The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space did not agree 
on the proposal submitted to the legal subcommittee, so the matter went up to 
the General Assembly for discussion.109 
The General Assembly later adopted Resolution 1962, which includes the 
language: “Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by 
all states,” and “Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means.”110 
During negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty, the French delegation raised 
the question of exactly how “use” should be construed.111 Specifically, there was 
a question about whether “use” means mere exploration or if it contemplates 
actual exploitation of celestial resources.112 The Soviet delegation replied, in 
part, that the committee should not “attempt to prescribe rules for situations on 
which it [is] impossible to form adequate judgement at the present stage.”113 The 
Generally Assembly adopted Resolution 2222 as the Outer Space Treaty in its 
twenty-first session,114 leaving virtually no travaux relating to property rights in 
Outer Space. Regardless, it is clear from the early documents and debates that 
inspired the Outer Space Treaty that a few things were always important to the 
drafters: peaceful use, scientific exploration, and non-appropriation.  
 
 105 G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), at 5 (Dec. 12, 1959). 
 106 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on Its Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/5181 (1962). 
 107 Id. 7–9. 
 108 Id. at 8. 
 109 Id. at 3. 
 110 G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), at 1 (Dec. 13, 1963). 
 111 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm. on its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 (Oct. 20, 1966). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 11. 
 114 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966). 
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B. Teleological Approach  
The third method of treaty interpretation is the teleological approach—also 
called purposivism—which endeavors to interpret a treaty in the way most in 
line with its purpose, rather than following the ordinary meaning of its text or 
ascertaining the intent of its drafters.115 The goal of a teleological analysis is to 
“give[] scope to the fundamental reason or problem [the treaty] was supposed to 
address.”116 The teleological approach is rooted in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, which requires treaties to be interpreted in light of their “object and 
purpose” while also adhering to “relevant rules of international law.”117 The 
“object and purpose” of a treaty is a broad phrase referring to a “treaty’s goals 
and the character of the means employed to achieve them.”118 
Examining the era in which the Outer Space Treaty was drafted highlights 
its purpose. As briefly mentioned in Part I,119 it would be a mistake to analyze 
the Outer Space Treaty today without appreciating the events of the world at the 
time of its drafting and entry into force. The Soviet Union’s successful launch 
of Sputnik-1 took the globe by surprise and led to American apprehension about 
its Cold War rival.120 Specifically, there was fear that this new access to outer 
space would encourage a nuclear war.121 It can also be said that the United States 
was worried that the Soviet Union was getting ahead of it with regard to 
scientific developments.122 The current form of, and signatories to, the Outer 
Space Treaty suggests that other countries were likely just as concerned.123  
These concerns of impending war and a “space race” of countries to 
potentially claim territory in outer space is explicit in the language of the Treaty. 
As Johnathan Galloway analogizes to game theory, two Cold War rivals were 
involved in a zero-sum conflict where one would come out on top, or a non-
zero-sum situation where the two countries would eventually work together to 
achieve a purpose for the use of outer space that the entire globe could benefit 
from.124  
 
 115 BEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 81, at 23. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84. 
 118 David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive 
Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSACTIONAL L. 565, 580 (2010). 
 119 See discussion supra Part I.  
 120 Kleiman, supra note 18; VON DER DUNK, supra note 18, at 36, 44.  
 121 Jonathan F. Galloway, Revolution and Evolution in the Law of Outer Space, 87 NEB. L. REV. 516, 516 
(2008).  
 122 Id. at 516–17. 
 123 United Nations Office for Disarmanent Affaira, supra note 16. 
 124 Id. at 517. 
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The most relevant Articles in the Outer Space Treaty confirm it was the 
second purpose—a peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all—that won 
out. The application of the Article II non-appropriation doctrine properly applies 
to all actors, state and private. This conclusion most significantly supports the 
underlying historical purpose the time of the Treaty’s drafting reflects, and the 
global problems and threats it was intended to respond to. 
Although all three forms of interpretation do, to varying degrees, support a 
conclusion that the non-appropriation doctrine of Article II prohibits all forms 
of celestial ownership (state and private), the textualist approach most strongly 
supports it. The argument is especially strong given the Vienna Convention’s 
requirement that treaty interpretation always start with the ordinary meaning of 
its text.125 As concluded in Part III,126 a textualist analysis of Article II of the 
Treaty leads to a finding that its language covers all actors, private and state. 
Further, the secondary forms of interpretation, intentionalist and teleological, 
support this conclusion as well. A finding that the Outer Space Treaty covers all 
actors is a result that does not conflict with the spirit, purpose, or context of the 
text when examined alongside secondary methods such as travaux and a 
historical examination of the global events at the time of the Treaty’s drafting. 
Combined, this reflects an object and purpose of the Treaty that naturally leads 
to a conclusion that its non-appropriation effect should be binding on all actors. 
III. THE CASE FOR A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
Even beyond formal modes of treaty interpretation, an argument also exists 
for the use of canons of construction to support this stance. 
A. Other Methods of Interpretation: Expressio unius est exclusion alterius  
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius is a widely accepted international 
canon of interpretation.127 It states that when interpreting international materials, 
one should presume things not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, 
not inadvertence.128 Defined as “[a] canon of construction holding that to express 
or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative,”129 
the canon can theoretically be applied to support the conclusion that the Outer 
 
 125 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84. 
 126 See discussion supra Part III. 
 127 See Charlie Stewart, The Rhetoric Canons of Construction: New Textualism’s Rhetoric Problem, 116 
MICH. LAW. REV. 1485, 1495 (2018). 
 128 Wasser & Jobes, supra note 26, at 47. 
 129 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 101. 
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Space Treaty does indeed prohibit the appropriation of celestial resources by 
both state and private actors. 
At the time of the Treaty’s drafting, in the 1960s, only state actors were 
interested in outer space endeavors; it was far beyond the realm of possibility 
for the drafters to even imagine the technological advancements and 
privatization of space interests that have since occurred. Through the treaty, the 
drafters were speaking only to the audience to whom it would apply: sovereigns. 
If the drafters intended for private actors to be governed differently, expressio 
unius could be applied negatively to support that they would have explicitly 
addressed this in the Treaty.130 Because Article II of the Treaty addresses a 
specific issue (non-appropriation of celestial resources and bodies) within the 
context of every actor to which it applied at the time of its drafting (state actors 
only), the canon should apply to say if the drafters wanted any interested entity 
to be excluded from the Treaty’s non-appropriation effect, they would have 
expressly stated so in the text, thus drastically altering its literal interpretation.  
IV. A NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY CONFLICTS WITH THE TEXT  
A. Silence as to Private Actors 
A narrow interpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, concluding 
that it applies to state actors only, conflicts with the text. The argument for a 
narrow interpretation rests on the conclusion that because the Treaty does not 
address property rights per se, there is no prohibition against private 
appropriation of celestial resources.131 Some scholars extend this argument to 
say that because the Treaty only addresses appropriation by a sovereign, it is not 
binding on private appropriation of celestial resources, therefore allowing legal 
ownership over any part of outer space by an individual or private 
organization.132 
 
 130 Indeed, it is not clear that the doctrine expressio unius is typically used negatively in this way. The 
doctrine could be, and has been, used to suggest that the drafters’ failure to mention private actors was instead 
deliberate, and therefore, the treaty does not apply to private actors. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 26, at 47; 
Brittingham, supra note 21, at 36. However, a negative use, taking the doctrine a step further, does support the 
conclusion that the Treaty should be applied broadly and actually aligns most closely with the actual text and 
ordinary meaning of the Treaty.  
 131 See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, The International Space Treaty Regime in the Globalization Era, AD 
ASTRA, Fall 2005, at 30, http://www.space-settlement-institute.org/Articles/IntlSpaceTreatyGabryno.pdf. 
 132 See id.; P.J. Blount & Christian J. Robison, One Small Step: The Impact of the U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 on the Exploitation of Resources in Outer Space, 18 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 160, 
165 (2016); Wasser & Jobes, supra note 26, at 46. 
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While attractive, this argument fails to recognize the authority of the Vienna 
Convention; treaty interpretation must start with the text of the treaty and not an 
analysis of its drafters’ perceived intent.133 Only if such a textualist analysis 
yields a result that conflicts with the spirit, purpose, or context of the text should 
one turn to secondary methods of interpretation. This argument skips an 
important step in the analytical process by overlooking the textualist 
interpretation of the Treaty. A textualist interpretation, as examined in Part III,134 
supports a broad application of the non-appropriation doctrine.  
B. Jurisdictional Control  
Scholars also advance an argument that the Treaty bars states from 
appropriating territorial sovereignty over celestial resources, but allows for a 
“functional” property right—a jurisdictional control—over objects and persons, 
and by virtue of that, the celestial land to which it is attached for the time it is 
attached.135 The argument here is grounded in Article VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty, which is said to confer the “functional” property right.136  
The problem with this argument is that it conflates jurisdictional control with 
true property rights. The treaty does allow jurisdictional control over objects 
(equipment sent into space, for instance), but it does not “prescribe a system in 
which jurisdictional control can be used to establish real property rights.”137 
Therefore, this “functional” property right argument fails to establish a 
framework for valid appropriation of celestial resources under the Outer Space 
Treaty, and cannot, by extension, protect the SPACE Act of 2015.  
 
 133 OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 1271. 
 134 See discussion supra Part III. 
 135 See Wayne N. White, Real Property Rights in Outer Space, Proceedings, 40th Colloquium on the Law 
of Outer Space, 1998, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, http://www.spacefuture.com/ 
archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml; Dalton, supra note 31, at 14.  
 136 Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty states: “A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object 
launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel 
thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including 
objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence 
in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found 
beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State 
Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 
11.  
 137 Andrew R. Brehm, Note & Comment, Private Property in Outer Space: Establishing a Foundation for 
Future Exploration, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353, 360 (2015). 
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C. Practical Concerns: Government Force 
Another argument some scholars advocate for is that the United States is 
asserting its intentions with the passage of the SPACE Act of 2015 without any 
regard to the Outer Space Treaty through hegemony.138 If the international 
community allows countries to pass domestic laws like the United States SPACE 
Act of 2015, it is allowing those countries to completely disregard the Outer 
Space Treaty and instead engage in hegemony. This is essentially a “so what” 
approach where a country uses its military power and international authority to 
exercise dominance over an outer space resource to the exclusion of all other 
countries, and without regard to the Outer Space Treaty.139 As Alfred McCoy 
points out, such international displays of hegemonic power are not a new 
practice of the United States,140 and it is likely that the United States intends the 
passage of the SPACE Act of 2015 to be one of these displays.141 The biggest 
problem with this perspective is that it does not really resolve the dissonance 
between the Treaty and the Act at all, but simply ignores it. It also seems unlikely 
that the international community will accept this kind of dominion over outer 
space resources by one or a few countries without forceful opposition by other 
states.  
Moving forward, it makes most sense for the current international regime 
against appropriation of outer space resources to control for reasons that go 
beyond international norms of treaty law. First, as previously discussed, there is 
a risk of hegemony over outer space resources if the United States protects its 
citizens’ appropriation. Further, the risk of hegemony and its potential for abuse 
goes against the purpose of the original Outer Space Treaty itself. It is apparent 
that concerns about ensuring international cooperation and agreement over outer 
space in its entirety was important to the drafters. In addition, the drafters were 
very specific in their desire for outer space to be the province of all humankind 
for scientific use and other peaceful purposes.142 Allowing the United States to 
continue its apparent path of appropriation through hegemony goes directly 
against the purpose of the Outer Space Treaty. It, by its very definition, gives 
only countries—like the United States—first dibs, and therefore the rights to 
 
 138 See Alison Morris, Note, Intergalactic Property Law: A New Regime for a New Age, 19 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 1085, 1088, 1102 (2017).  
 139 See Id. at 1102–05. 
 140 See Alfred W. McCoy, You Must Follow International Law (Unless You’re America), THE NATION 
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/you-must-follow-international-law-unless-youre-america/. 
 141 Morris, supra note 139, at 1102.  
 142 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.  
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claim ownership over outer space resources simply because they have the means 
to get there.  
In a theoretical world where the Outer Space Treaty does not continue to 
control, consequences of a space race to claim as many celestial resources as 
possible is likely to ensue. Without the Outer Space Treaty, countries are 
essentially free to use outer space in any way they wish without giving any 
regard to other countries or the celestial resources themselves. For instance, a 
country could mount a nuclear weapon on the moon or dump its nuclear waste 
in outer space without facing any real repercussions for doing so. It is necessary 
to have some kind of instrument to govern the use of outer space. If the Outer 
Space Treaty does not continue to control, then another treaty or instrument is 
necessary to ensure the safety and ecological impact of using outer space.  
Clearly, private development in outer space has the potential to be very 
desirable, as companies like SpaceX and Moon Express are currently 
demonstrating.143 The resources available in outer space are essentially limitless, 
and their development has extremely profitable potential.144 While the current 
international regime under the Outer Space Treaty does not allow for such 
private development through appropriation, either a different treaty or an 
international agency could replace the Outer Space Treaty to attain those 
aspirations. A different treaty could achieve everything that was important to the 
drafters of the Outer Space Treaty and simply alter the language prohibiting 
appropriation, but only if such appropriation is peaceful in nature.  
The establishment of an international agency to regulate appropriation and 
use of celestial resources is another strong option.145 A compromise using an 
agency like this is the result of “intergovernmental agreements, clear legal 
structure, joint funding, coordinated technology, and a limited self-interested 
body independent of the United Nations.”146 The International Space Station is 
an example of an international agency like this that has seen great success as a 
shared entity between multiple states.147 
Concerns about what may happen if the Treaty continues to control and the 
United States disregards it, or if the Treaty should not control at all in the future, 
really come down to whether it is best to allow private appropriation of celestial 
 
 143 See Baidawi & Chang, supra note 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 6.  
 144 Id. 
 145 Morris, supra note 139, at 1106–07. 
 146 Id. at 1106. 
 147 See Morris, supra note 139, at 1107.  
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resources. If it is, the current international regime governing celestial 
appropriation in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty should face a complete 
overturn or replacement by a new treaty or international agency. Regardless, 
appropriation of any kind in outer space should not be mandated by national 
hegemons, but instead by a clear international regime agreed to by space-faring 
states that respects equality and ecological fairness.  
CONCLUSION 
The Outer Space Treaty is the principal treaty that regulates international 
endeavors in outer space, and it specifically prohibits appropriation of outer 
space resources and bodies. This conclusion finds support not only through the 
three most widely-accepted methods of treaty interpretation, but also through 
canons of construction and practical concerns.  
A textualist interpretation that supports a broad application of Article II is 
most proper. And even through analysis using secondary methods of 
interpretation (intentionalist or teleological interpretations), the textualist result 
still prevails. A broad interpretation of the Treaty remains most true to the spirit 
of the text, and is most consistent with its travaux and the state of technology 
and global events at the time of its drafting.  
The world today is very different than it was fifty years ago when the Outer 
Space Treaty emerged. American companies like SpaceX and Moon Express 
have shown the desirability that private development of outer space may have, 
and demonstrate that such development might be highly valuable in the future.148 
Through the SPACE Act of 2015, the United States recognizes this and is 
attempting to make it easier for these companies to do the work they aim to 
without significant interference.149 If it is desirable to allow appropriation of 
outer space resources, the current international governing regime under the 
Outer Space Treaty simply will not work. It clearly bars all forms of 
appropriation; therefore, the creation of a new regime is necessary to support 
those goals.  
It is unlikely that such private development can occur without appropriating 
celestial resources. If there is no change in international law to allow it—either 
by a treaty or by the creation of an international agency—it is possible that some 
countries will adopt a “so what” attitude and pass domestic laws, similar to the 
SPACE Act of 2015, that support their own celestial endeavors through 
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hegemony, without any regard to other countries or the safety or ecological 
stability of outer space. And if the Outer Space Treaty faces rejection without 
replacement by a different governing instrument, there may be a great risk of a 
race among countries to claim as many resources as they can in outer space. 
Therefore, even if private development is most desirable and the international 
community agrees to either alter or replace the non-appropriation effect of the 
Outer Space Treaty, there must be some governing instrument or body to 
regulate the use of outer space at the risk of things getting completely out of 
hand.  
There exists a direct counter-argument that Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty does not apply to private actors at all, only to state actors.150 This 
argument rests primarily on the idea that a treaty is a kind of contract between 
states that benefits their citizens but does not directly bind their citizens to 
international obligations.151 However, the purpose behind the drafting of the 
Treaty in the first place most logically stands for the conclusion that ensuring 
safety and ecological standards in outer space has always been important.152 
Allowing a loophole for private actors to essentially do whatever they want with 
celestial resources and planetary bodies goes directly against the core purpose 
of having such a treaty in the first place.  
There is also a strong argument that the canon expressio unius can cut the 
other way.153 Even though it is unlikely that the drafters of the Outer Space 
Treaty contemplated private development in outer space, their failure to mention 
private actors expresses a deliberate choice.154 Expressio unius, if applied 
positively, says the treaty does not apply to private actors at all. However, if this 
true, private actors technically have free reign to do essentially whatever they 
want in outer space without any real international limits on that freedom. 
Because the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty expressed concern with limiting 
the power of states to appropriate and use outer space for self-interested gain,155 
it is a stretch to say that the drafters would agree to allow private entities to do 
the same. It is more sound that the canon should apply to say that if the drafters 
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intend any entity, private or state, to be excepted from the Treaty’s bar on 
appropriation, it would be directly expressed in the text of the treaty.  
By its passage of the SPACE Act of 2015, the United States is implicitly 
adopting a hegemonic approach to future appropriation of celestial resources. 
The Act explicitly allows United States citizens to recover and own resources 
extracted from celestial bodies,156 thus creating a property right. Passage of the 
act is a signal that the United States, a sovereign, is creating and enforcing that 
property right.  
Because this creation of the property right deals with outer space and 
celestial resources, it directly implicates the Outer Space Treaty, which in 
Article II broadly rejects appropriation of any kind in outer space.157 The United 
States’ creation of a property right that an international treaty directly governs 
constitutes an act of sovereignty that is impermissible under the Outer Space 
Treaty. Through its current language, the SPACE Act of 2015 creates an illegal 
property right as against Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and is thus invalid 
without further amendment or replacement of the Treaty itself.  
The dreams and work of private aerospace organizations like SpaceX and 
Moon Express may be for nothing. While their milestones are commendable and 
their dreams desirable, they simply cannot achieve what they have set out to 
without valid assurance—both nationally and internationally—that once they 
reach outer space, they can reap what they sow. Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty should be interpreted broadly as to cover both private and state entities. 
The resulting effect of Article II is a bar on all appropriation of celestial 
resources, thus impeding private development in outer space and invaliding the 
SPACE Act of 2015.  
For private aerospace companies to achieve their goals, a shift in the current 
international regulatory regime is necessary. Either the Outer Space Treaty must 
undergo amendment to specifically address private appropriation, or another 
treaty or international agency must replace it to oversee celestial development 
and ensure adherence to important considerations of safety and ecological 
fairness.  
On Tuesday, February 6, 2018, SpaceX successfully launched its Falcon 
Heavy rocket into the Earth’s orbit, carrying aboard Elon Musk’s own red 
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convertible.158 The Falcon Heavy rocket is only one of SpaceX’s many 
technological developments toward its goal of achieving celestial travel between 
Earth and Mars.159 Companies like SpaceX are clearly not slowing down. The 
question remains whether the international rule of law can keep up.  
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